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Since 2003, Zambia has been engaged in a large-scale, centrally coordinated national anti-Malaria
campaign which has become a model in sub-Saharan Africa. This paper aims at quantifying the individual
and macro level benefits of this campaign, which involved mass distribution of insecticide treated
mosquito nets, intermittent preventive treatment for pregnant women, indoor residual spraying, rapid
diagnostic tests, and artemisinin-based combination therapy.  We discuss the timing and regional coverage
of the program, and critically review the available health and program rollout data. To estimate the
health benefits associated with the program rollout, we use both population based morbidity measures
from the Demographic and Health Surveys and health facility based mortality data as reported in the
national Health Management Information System. While we find rather robust correlations between
the rollout of bed nets and subsequent improvements in our health measures, the link between regional









Harvard School of Public Health












1.  Introduction  
  The National Malaria Control Program (NMCP) of Zambia is one of Africa’s largest 
malaria prevention and treatment initiatives. In 2005, the NMCP set the goal of achieving a 75% 
reduction in malaria incidence and a 20% decrease in under-five mortality within five years 
through a combination of insecticide treated nets, indoor residual spraying, and deployment of 
rapid diagnostic tests and front-line combination therapy drugs.  The total 2008 malaria 
prevention and control budget, including in-kind contributions, was estimated at $59.8 million
1, 
including significant aid from the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank, the World 
Health Organization (WHO), and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (through the Malaria 
Control and Evaluation Partnership in Africa—MACEPA).   
  Figure 1 tells the story of the program’s success according to data in Zambia’s national 
health statistics system, the Health Management Information System (HMIS), which we discuss 
in detail in the next section.  The annual number of malaria deaths in the country decreased by at 
least half over the period 2000-2008, during which population rose by 30%, implying a reduction 
in the death rate of over 60%.  As will be seen below, the number of inpatient visits for malaria 
declined by a comparable magnitude, implying a reduction in morbidity as well as mortality.   
Evidence from the 2001 and 2007 waves of the Demographic and Health Survey 
confirms the picture painted by the HMIS.  The percentage of children under five reported with a 
fever over the two weeks preceding the interview dropped from 44.6% in 2001 to 17.9% in 2007, 
a reduction of close to 60%.  (As a comparison, the fraction of children suffering from diarrhea 
fell by only a quarter, from 41.9% to 31.8%, over the same time period.)  The progress made in 
all-cause child mortality between the two surveys is remarkable:  The under-five mortality rate 
fell from 168 per thousand live births in 2001 to 119 in 2007.  As discussed below, the latter 
figure may not even reflect the full mortality reduction to date.  This decline was not solely the 
result of the malaria initiative, however, since other health campaigns were taking place at the 
same time.   
There are different ways to quantify the magnitude of Zambia’s recent success in health 
improvement.  The reduction in under-five mortality represents approximately 25,000 children’s 
lives saved per year.  To compare the mortality improvement with more “economic” outcomes, 
we can do a back of the envelope calculation using the Human Development Index (HDI), which 
weighs economic and non-economic characteristics into an overall measure of quality of life.  
Using the formula for the HDI, one can calculate the amount of income growth that would be 
equivalent to a particular rise in life expectancy at birth.  A conservative estimate, using just the 
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data on under-five mortality, is that life expectancy at birth in Zambia rose by 2.25 years over the 
period 2000-2007.
2  Plugging this into the HDI formula shows that an equivalent rise in HDI 
would be achieved if income per capita grew by 25%.
3   
In the research program of which this paper is a part, we study the Zambian malaria 
initiative with three broad goals.  First, we want to systematize and improve the quality of 
available data on both inputs to malaria control in Zambia and the outcomes of the malaria 
control program.  As will be seen below, much of the available data were not easily interpretable 
before we began our efforts, so that the review and consolidation of existing data sources became 
a substantial part of this research endeavor.  The second goal of the project is to use the available 
data from Zambia to examine the causal relationship between inputs into malaria control and 
health outcomes.  Much of the monitoring of the campaign’s progress has focused solely on the 
input and implementation side, with outcome measures such as the number of bed nets 
distributed or houses sprayed.  Jointly analyzing data on inputs and health outcomes allows for 
some measurement of how well the program is doing in achieving its stated overall health goal, 
and possibly also for inference about cost-effectiveness.  Finally, our third goal (which we do not 
advance in the current paper) is to use the experience of the current malaria campaign in Zambia 
to understand the economic effects of malaria and of its control. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows.  In Section 2, we discuss our data sources 
regarding both health outcomes and inputs into malaria control.  A good deal of our effort in this 
project has gone into improving the quality of the data in the  Zambia’s HMIS, an administrative 
record system that has the potential to yield richly detailed data, but is also subject to a number 
of problems.  We discuss the HMIS data, how we have tried to help improve it, and the picture of 
changing malaria impact painted in this improved data.  Section 3 describes the background to 
and scope of the current malaria initiative.  Section 4 presents data on how the different 
components of the initiative have been rolled out, focusing in variation among different regions.  
In Section 5, we attempt to assess the link between data on the rollout – that is, inputs to reduced 
malaria – and data on improvements in malaria mortality and morbidity, using both the HMIS 
and the Zambian Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS).  Section 6 concludes by discussing 
avenues for future research and also the challenge of sustaining the progress made in Zambia 
over time.  
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2.  Data on Malaria and Other Health Outcomes  
In this paper we rely on two data sources: first, the 2001 and 2007 waves of the 
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), and second, the Zambian Health Management 
Information System (HMIS).
4 
2.1  DHS data 
Our first source of data are the 2001 and 2007 waves of the Zambian Demographic and 
Health Survey (ZDHS).  For our analysis, we use the children recode files, which contain 
detailed information on all children under age 5 at the date of the interview as well as a complete 
list of household and respondent characteristics. We have 13,219 child observations, 6,877 from 
2001, and 6,342 from 2007.  
To link the DHS households to the NMCC’s rollout data, we used ArcGIS to map DHS 
cluster locations into the respective districts. All 72 districts were covered in the 2001 survey; 70 
out of 72 were covered in 2007.  
2.2  HMIS data 
The national Health Management Information System (HMIS) captures an impressive 
amount of routine health data.  The database was first introduced in 1995 to collect disease data, 
service delivery information, and clinic operations reports.  It provides data on health outcomes 
in the vast majority of Zambia’s health facilities. These range in size from hospitals (located in 
60 of the 72 districts in Zambia) to small health posts staffed by a single nurse or community 
health worker.
5   
The database has recently been subject to major technical revisions, resulting in a system 
with a monthly reporting structure and new management software that captures additional 
indicators, including separate measures for confirmed and unconfirmed malaria cases. Officially 
the new HMIS became the primary reporting system beginning January 2009. Most districts 
transitioned into the new system by reporting in both formats for some part of 2008. Using 
historical data however, the analysis presented in this paper is based on files from the “old” 
HMIS.  The following description relates to this original system.  
                                                           
4 A third potential source of data is the Malaria Indicators Survey (MIS) conducted in 2006 and 2008. The MIS 
collects data on household uptake of anti malarial measures (such as use of bed nets and IRS) and health outcomes 
such as child sickness.  However, this data was not available for our use at the time of this writing.   
5 Lusaka’s referral hospitals are not included in the HMIS in order to prevent redundancy; theoretically, every 
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Traditionally, health data were passed from each of the reporting health facilities to the 
respective district office (72), and then passed on from the district to the regional offices (9 in 
Zambia).  The facilities kept both hard copy patient logs and tally sheets that track clinic 
functions.  At the end of each quarter, facilities reported their summary data to district offices.  
District health information officers were charged with collecting the reports from each health 
facility and compiling district reports. They were responsible for ensuring all health facilities had 
reported, as well as cleaning each facility’s data.  
Provincial data management specialists collected data from the districts and compiled a 
provincial data set disaggregated at the facility level. Before forwarding the data on to the 
national level, the provincial officers once again cleaned the data and verified it for 
completeness. The provincial data sets were compiled into a unified national data set at the 
Ministry of Health’s headquarters. This data set remained disaggregated at the facility level. 
Given the multi-level reporting system, the potential for error was relatively large in the 
original system, and the quality of health facility data was dependent on staff and their 
commitment to record keeping. Some health facilities had been meticulous about their record 
keeping, plotting their health outcomes manually and discussing them in meetings.  Others had 
not been able to keep records in conjunction with patient visits, or had delegated reporting 
requirements to semi-literate staff.  In some cases, tally sheets were only updated on a monthly 
basis and figures estimated when regular reporting was limited.   
The transfer from health facility paper records to electronic district summaries was also 
error-prone.  The original HMIS database had no built-in consistency checks for disease data, 
and data were entered only once, without systematic data verification
6  
Quarterly updates from districts to provinces were then processed centrally, with only the 
most recent quarter received from the provinces appended to previous data.   However, even 
after initial submission deadlines, data staff at sub-national levels continued to work on 
assembling missing data and auditing reports.  As a result, changes subsequently made at the 
district or province level were lost in the national data set. When data were cleaned at the district 
and provincial levels, revised data sets were not returned to the original sources of the data. 
Consequently, major inconsistencies existed between the data sets at different levels of the health 
system. 
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responsible for less than ten facilities, others for more than forty.   6 
 
Improvement of the HMIS 
Ultimately, the HMIS is the only source of consistent national health data. Selected 
surveys (especially the Demographic and Health Surveys and the Malaria Indicator Surveys) 
provide more accurate snapshots of malaria levels in select districts at given times, but only the 
HMIS allows for detailed, localized analysis of malaria levels over time. With this in mind, a 
major goal of this project was to improve and validate the HMIS data as much as possible.  
To facilitate this data improvement goal, the project team conceptualized a series of 
malaria data verification workshops; in collaboration with the National Malaria Control Centre 
one HMIS workshop was organized in each of Zambia’s nine provinces.   In preparation for 
these workshops, we systematically scanned HMIS data for outliers and suspicious data points 
(duplicate figures, significant variance between quarters or years, reporting inconsistencies).   
District health officials were asked to find missing reports and justify all irregular data ahead of 
the workshops.  This data audit served as one of the final updates of health data from 2000 to 
2008, ahead of its transition into the new HMIS system.
7 
The workshops also provided an opportunity to reconcile incomplete or mismatching data 
on malaria prevention and treatment campaigns at the district level.  Districts were asked to visit 
each health facility in an attempt to capture all malaria interventions within the facility’s 
catchment area by government and non-government partners.  District pharmacists provided 
distribution data on treatment courses and diagnostic tests at local health facilities, while 
environmental health technicians provided data on IRS activities.  During the workshops, these 
data were pooled with health outcomes, presented, and discussed by the district staff.   
Subsequently, it could be used by the project team to plausibility-check the national data sets.   
In total, the nine provincial workshops were conducted at a total cost of approximately 
$200,000.  Funding was provided by the Malaria Consortium and MACEPA, as well as the 
National Malaria Control Centre with support from a World Bank Grant. The workshops brought 
together a diverse array of district health personnel, including district information officers, 
malaria focal point persons, and district directors of health. Provincial and national health 
officers also attended each workshop. In total, over 250 attendees were trained in various aspects 
of data collection, cleaning, and analysis.  
                                                           
7 These resulting changes sometimes had major implications for national level trends. For instance, in the 
uncorrected HMIS, under-five malaria deaths rose from 3,342 in 2006 to 3,783 in 2007.  These figures were  
reported in the 2008 World Malaria Report, among other places.  The workshops showed that the reported increase 
was due to three districts with erroneous figures.  In the fully corrected HMIS, under-five malaria deaths fell from 
3,235 in 2006 to 2,680 in 2007. 7 
 
The workshops resulted in a more complete, correct, and consistent HMIS database for 
the years 2000 through 2008, as outlined in Table 1.  In terms of completeness, the original 
national-level HMIS files that we received ahead of the workshops had 3,318 records marked as 
missing (out of a total of approximately 45,000 facility quarterly reports that should have been 
present). Over the course of the malaria data verification workshops, 1,901 missing quarterly 
reports could be retrieved. Also, data were added on 28 facilities that had no HMIS records 
altogether, bringing the total number of facilities in the system to 1,501.   Reviewing apparent 
data entry errors ahead of the workshops allowed district staff to conduct major revisions. 
Finally, the most recent versions of the district’s HMIS databases were disseminated to the 
national level, thereby ensuring consistent insights for both local and central decision-making. 
While the workshops resulted in a higher quality HMIS data set, they also built local 
capacity through several days of training to on how to compile and analyze integrated health 
databases.  Participants were encouraged to challenge each other’s presentations, and lively 
debates were common.  In many cases, these workshops provided the first opportunity for district 
medical officers to use data to consider the effects of interventions they had implemented and 
create strategic plans for future interventions.  Data analysis capabilities empower local staff and 
generate decentralized interest in accurate and complete data; thiswas considered a promising 
approach by the Ministry of Health and its partners, andfollow-up workshops have since been 
initiated in several provinces. 
2.2.1  Remaining Issues in the HMIS Data 
Diagnosis and Access to Health Facilities 
The number of malaria cases that are reported in HMIS is potentially biased by several 
factors that cannot be readily uncovered in the data. The first issue is inconsistencies in 
diagnostic practices over time. The HMIS is supposed to report all outpatient and inpatient visits, 
broken down by diagnosis.  The problem is that the way in which malaria is diagnosed has 
changed over the period we examine.  Because of both lack of diagnostic technology and 
differential treatment guidelines, a majority of fevers in Zambia were traditionally classified (and 
treated) as malaria.  As discussed in further detail below, the rollout of the national anti-malaria 
initiative has included the massive deployment of rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) to health centers, 
in order to economize on malaria treatment and properly treat non-malaria fevers.  The 
deployment of RDTs would have led to a reduction in diagnosed cases of malaria even if there 
was no true change in disease prevalence, as well as an increased diagnosis of other conditions, 
such as respiratory tract infections. Since the method of diagnosis is not tracked in the original 
HMIS, quantifying the magnitude of this “diagnostic effect” is not straightforward. 8 
 
Another bias from diagnosis concerns HIV/AIDS.  With HIV/AIDS highly stigmatized, 
anecdotal reports from the clinics suggest that a considerable fraction of HIV deaths were 
officially classified as malaria mortality.  Given the large inflow of foreign funding for HIV 
treatment over the last five years, HIV mortality has fallen substantially, which may have 
contributed to the officially recorded declines in malaria mortality. 
Another issue is that the accessibility of the health system changed over time. This is 
most dramatically shown in outpatient data for adults in rural facilities. A large increase in this 
variable is recorded in 2006, which can likely be attributed to the abolition of user fees in rural 
health clinics in the same year. Prior to 2006, all public-sector patients were expected to pay 
nominal fees for consultations, diagnostic tests and some drugs supplied in government clinics. 
In 2006, all consultation and diagnostic fees were removed for patients living in designated rural 
areas. It is likely that prior to the elimination of user fees, many would-be outpatients had 
resorted to self-treatment. 
To minimize the bias from such contextual factors, we focus on severe cases – 
specifically, inpatient malaria cases, reported malaria deaths, and reported total deaths.  In the 
HMIS, diagnostic codes for inpatients are entered only at the time of discharge or death.  We 
think that even prior to the abolition of user fees or the advent of RDTs, severe cases would have 
received inpatient treatment and would have been correctly diagnosed most of the time (prior to 
the advent of RDTs, malaria diagnoses could be confirmed using microscopy at many clinics and 
hospitals treating severe malaria). 
Extent of HMIS Coverage 
A potential worry about the HMIS is that it only measures cases that enter the 
government’s health system.  To the extent that this is a small fraction of total cases, one would 
worry both that it is non-representative and, more seriously, that the fraction of cases captured by 
the HMIS varies over time.  In the latter case, the use of the HMIS to measure trends in disease 
prevalence would be seriously compromised.   
One way to measure the fraction of cases that the HMIS captures is to focus on deaths, 
because in this case there is the possibility to use other data sources as a benchmark.   Figure 2 
shows the under-five death rate (annual deaths of children under five in the HMIS per 1,000 
children; population data are estimates from Ministry of Health). The data for the full sample 
show a relatively steady decline from 8.46 in 2000 to 5.05 in 2007, followed by a precipitous 
decline to 3.26 in 2008.  This last figure may represent incomplete reporting for 2008.  In the 
high quality sample (where we use only consistently reporting facilities as discussed below), the 
trend from 2000-2007 is roughly similar, but the decline in 2008 is smaller, suggesting that 
increasing under-reporting might indeed be an issue for the aggregate 2008 data. 9 
 
We can compare the count of deaths in the HMIS to both the DHS and to other mortality 
estimates.  Most estimates of child mortality are expressed in terms of deaths before age five per 
1,000 live births.  To convert the HMIS data to this metric, we simply multiply the number of 
under 5 deaths per 1000 by five (this is a slight over-estimate because the number of children 
declines with age due to population growth and mortality.)  Thus in the HMIS data, the child 
mortality rate was approximately 42.3 per 1,000 children under 5 in 2000, and 25.3 in 2007; 
deaths declined by 40.2%. In the DHS, deaths per thousand live births were calculated at 168 in 
2001-2 and 119 in 2007, implying a decline of 29%.
 8   Other published estimates of child 
mortality show numbers similar to the DHS for 2000, but do not show the same decline as 
observed in the HMIS and DHS.  For example, WHO World Health Statistics 2009 lists the 
under five mortality rate for Zambia as 178 in 2000 and 170 in 2007.  It is not clear what the 
source for these numbers is, although other WHO publications rely on the DHS estimate for the 
year 2000.  We suspect that the lack of decline in these published figures reflects non-availability 
of data, rather than information from an alternative source.   
Using either the DHS or WHO number for 2000 as a benchmark implies that the HMIS in 
that year is capturing between a fifth and a quarter of deaths under age five.  In terms of the 
change between 2000 and 2007, the HMIS shows a larger decline than the DHS, although in both 
cases the magnitude is impressive.  Further, it is important to note that the DHS measures under-
five mortality by looking at the experience of all children born in the last five years.  Thus the 
number from the 2007 DHS includes children born in 2003, whose early life (when mortality is 
highest) was not impacted by the malaria initiative.  Thus it is expected that the decline in the 
HMIS would be larger.  If instead of using the HMIS death rate in 2007, we use the average 
death rate from 2003-2007, then the decline in under-five mortality in the HMIS is 29%, exactly 
matching the DHS.   
  The low representation of total deaths in the HMIS suggests several possible biases.   
Presumably the fraction of disease episodes and deaths that reach a clinic or hospital is higher in 
urban regions than in remote, rural areas.
9  Since malaria is higher in rural regions, this suggests 
that malaria deaths are understated in the HMIS data.  Regarding the change in malaria 
prevalence as a result of the anti-malaria initiative, sorting out the bias is more difficult.  On the 
one hand, the intensity of the program was probably highest in the same areas (places with health 
facilities nearby) that are overrepresented in the HMIS.  This might suggest that the HMIS data 
would overstate the impact of the program.  On the other hand, areas that were near clinics, 
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especially cities, were likely relatively better served and had lower malaria impact prior to the 
initiative.  Thus the HMIS data may be underweighting places where the largest scope for 
impacting malaria incidence.   
  To further investigate the bias from undercounting in the HMIS, Figure 3 compares 
under- five mortality by province in the DHS and HMIS.  The data from the DHS are the under-
five mortality rates for 2007.  From the HMIS, we take under-five deaths in 2007, divided by an 
estimate of under-five population, then multiplied by five to make a figure consistent with the 
DHS measure.  The extent to which the ratio of HMIS to DHS deaths differs among provinces is 
quite surprising.  At the high end, in the Copperbelt province, HMIS deaths are 32% of those 
implied by the DHS.  At the low end, in Lusaka, deaths in the HMIS are only 6% of those 
implied by the DHS.  The explanation for the low fraction of deaths recorded in the HMIS in 
Lusaka is that the city’s two major hospitals are not included in the HMIS since they are 
considered referral hospitals and not primary health facilities. However, most critical patients in 
the Lusaka area would end up in one of the referral hospitals.  Theoretically, all patients are 
supposed to be seen at another health center prior to admission to these hospitals, and the 
hospital is supposed to report back to the referring center with the patient’s outcome for entry 
into the HMIS.  The available data suggests that the final treatment outcomes at the referral 
centers do not make it back into the referring center’s HMIS records.   
  To check whether undercounting in the HMIS might bias conclusions regarding changes 
in malaria over time, Figure 4 compares the province-level change in under-five mortality in the 
DHS between 2001 and 2007 with the change in deaths in the HMIS per 1,000 children under 
five.  The fit is relatively good (correlation 0.76).  This gives us confidence that changes in the 
HMIS reflect actual changes in malaria mortality and morbidity.   
Non-reporting facilities 
  A final concern with the corrected HMIS is the potential confusion between health 
facilities that have no cases to report and cases where data are actually missing.  Upon 
conclusion of the malaria data verification workshops, the HMIS had data on 1,501 health 
facilities reporting at some point between 2000 and 2008.  Each quarterly record has number of 
in- and outpatients under and over age five, as well as the number of deaths for up to 59 diseases 
– the total number of diseases recorded in the HMIS is 71.  About 20% of reporting health 
facilities deal only with outpatients.  Many of the remaining facilities have incomplete reporting.  
To make sure our results are not affected by differences in reporting, we construct a high quality 
sample consisting of 253 large hospitals with at least one patient reported in each quarter 
between 2000 and 2008 – a sample of 9108 quarter-year observation at the hospital level. To the 
extent that missing entries represent true zeros (no report because there was no malaria), this 11 
 
sample will lead to an underestimate of the true effects, as hospitals with few malaria patients 
might discontinue reporting malaria due to the observed declines. 
Table 2 shows data on inpatient visits and deaths broken into age groups (under-5 and 
5+), separately for malaria and for all non-malaria conditions.  We show the data both for all 
facilities, and for the set of “always reporting” facilities.  The table shows that, as discussed 
below, the decline in malaria prevalence has come at the same time as a dramatic improvement 
in health more generally, due primarily to massive scale up of HIV treatment and child health 
programs.  
Another notable feature is that among the group of all facilities, there is an apparently 
discontinuous drop in both in-patient visits and mortality, both for malaria and other conditions, 
in the year 2008.  Among the always-reporting facilities, there is a smaller drop in malaria cases 
and deaths as well as in non-malaria conditions.   It is possible that this is due to reporting 
problems in non-always-reporting facilities.  There is a particular drop off in the number of 
facilities providing non-zero reports in the last two quarters of 2008.  We believe this is due to 
both the switch over to the new HMIS and to delays in facility reports reaching Lusaka.  For 
these reasons, we assign little credence to the all-facilities drop in mortality in 2008. 
In Figure 5 we look at an alternative to the always reporting facilities.  We construct a 
chain index by looking for every pair of adjacent years at the full set of facilities that report in 
both years.   The overall story told in this data is not very different from the always reporting 
facilities.  From 2000 to 2008, under-five malaria deaths fall by 66% and deaths of people aged 
five and above fall by 59%.  The figure also shows a spike in over-five outpatients diagnosed 
with malaria in 2006, a phenomenon that may be associated with the abolition of user fees, as 
discussed above.   
As a final, very conservative way to look at the decline in malaria, we examine the ratio 
of malaria deaths to non-malaria deaths in Figure 6.  We do this for different age groups and for 
both all facilities and the always-reporting facilities.  If there were no actual improvement in 
non-malaria health outcomes, and the decline in non-malaria mortality in the HMIS reflected 
only reporting problems, then this measure would nonetheless correctly measure the decline in 
malaria mortality.  As the figure shows, the ratio of malaria to non-malaria mortality fell by 
between 1/3 and ½ over this period.    
2.2.2  Seasonality in the HMIS 
As a check on the quality of the data in the HMIS, and also to exploit some of its 
richness, we look at seasonal variation in the malaria incidence.  Table 3 shows the results of a 
basic regression with quarterly under 5 mortality as dependent variable with quarter and year 12 
 
fixed effects.
10  Figure 7 plots the coefficients on the quarter dummies for both total mortality 
and malaria mortality.  The seasonal fluctuations are strong, and are consistent with Zambia’s 
climate, as discussed below. With an average under-5 death rate of 1.75 per 1000, a negative 
coefficient of -0.7 in quarter three implies that the death burden in the best quarter is only about 
60% of the death burden in the worst quarter (quarter 1). These seasonal fluctuations are even 
more pronounced for malaria.  Overall, about half of the seasonal fluctuation in under-five 
mortality is driven by malaria. 
In columns 2 and 4 of Table 3, we divide the sample in the middle and estimate quarter 
dummies separately for the two halves.  Figure 8 shows the interacted quarter dummies for 
malaria mortality while Figure 9 shows the quarter dummies for all-cause mortality.  What we 
find is that the seasonality of both has gone down.  Indeed, the coefficients show that the decline 
in seasonality in malaria deaths (a change in .227 deaths per thousand in the worst quarter 
relative to the best) is more than 2/3 of the decline in the seasonality of total deaths (.317 deaths 
per thousand in the worst quarter relative to the best).  Malaria accounted for approximately 29% 
of under-five deaths over the entire sample period, so the large share of malaria in the decline in 
seasonality is not simply a reflection of the overall decline in the death rate.  
3.  Origins and Scope of the Zambia Malaria Control Program  
Zambia is a land-locked country in Southern Africa with three distinct seasons: a hot, dry 
season from late August to October; a warm, rainy season from approximately November to 
April; and a cool, dry season stretching from May to early August. In the cool season 
temperatures can be as low as 10 degrees Celsius
11, with both the lack of rain and the cool 
temperatures hindering mosquito reproduction; as such, reported cases of malaria are the lowest 
during the third quarter of the year. Traditionally malaria transmission is highest in the first and 
fourth quarters, peaking in March towards the end of the warm, rainy season.  The swampy 
Luapula Province in Zambia’s North remains the region’s hotspot, though malaria is traditionally 
endemic throughout the country.  
As discussed in Packard (2007), the malaria situation in Zambia prior to the current 
campaign was rather critical from a recent history perspective.  Annual malaria incidence rose 
from 121 per 1,000 in 1976 to 376 per 1,000 in 2000.  Among the factors that contributed to this 
deterioration were Zambia’s role as a front-line state in the struggle against apartheid, 
international constraints on the use of DDT, and the country’s broader economic decline (GDP 
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per capita at PPP rose from $954 at independence in 1964 to $1,235 in 1970 and peaked at 
$1,474 in 1976.  It then declined, reaching a nadir of $829 in 1995 before rising to $946 in 
2003.
12)  Zambia’s malaria control program had relied extensively on Indoor Residual Spraying, 
but by 1990 spraying had ceased altogether.  In addition, resistance to chloroquine  started to 
emerge rapidly across the country. 
The beginning of the current anti-malaria initiative was a result of a confluence of factors 
both in Zambia and elsewhere in the world.  In particular, the development of new technologies 
and a new alignment of priorities within the development community led to a desire to undertake 
a demonstration case showing the possibility of rapidly scaled up malaria control.  Resources 
would be concentrated on a single country with the goal of producing a tangible success, which 
would then serve as a model for neighboring countries.  Zambia was chosen as the test case 
because it was perceived as having the institutional capacity and political will to successfully 
undertake such a program and also because its climate made it all the more likely that success 
could be accomplished. 
3.1  Elements of program  
  Zambia’s integrated malaria control program is one of the world’s largest national 
treatment and prevention plans.  The program is led by the National Malaria Control Centre 
(NMCC), a sub-division of the Department of Public Health and Research within Zambia’s 
Ministry of Health. The national secretariat is responsible for overall program administration 
throughout the country and disburses funds to districts on a programmatic basis. The NMCC 
works in partnership with Medical Stores (a quasi-private national distribution program for all 
drugs and medical supplies in the public sector) to ensure that each district and referral hospital 
receives adequate supplies of drugs and diagnostic tools. Seventy-two District Medical Offices 
(previously “District Health Offices”) directly implement most national malaria prevention and 
treatment programs. The districts are grouped into nine provinces, each with a Provincial Health 
Office responsible for supervising district health programs. 
The program is funded by a collaboration between the Government of Zambia and 
national as well as international partners. From its own revenues and various support lines, the 
Government of Zambia budgeted $25.4 million for the Department of Public Health’s Malaria 
Control & Management activities in 2008.
13 This amounted to 61% of the department’s budget. 
                                                           
12 Penn World Tables, version 6.2.  Variable RGPCH in year 2000 constant international dollars.   GDP per capita 
rose a further 16 percent in total from 2003 to 2007 (World Development Indicators database), on the back of 
soaring copper prices.    The price of copper fell by 60% in the year to February 2009, suggesting that Zambia will 
be particularly hard hit in the current world slowdown.   
13Government of Zambia. Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure: Activity-Based Budget 2008. Lusaka. 14 
 
The total 2008 malaria prevention and control budget, including in-kind contributions from non-
governmental institutions, was estimated at $59.8 million,
14 though actual contributions may not 
have always matched pledges or projections.  
The largest component of the 2008 budget was the provision of insecticide-treated 
mosquito nets (ITNs). The $32.0 million allocated to this activity accounted for 54% of the 
NMCP’s overall 2008 budget, although budget allocations did not always match actual 
expenditure, sometimes due to donors failing to deliver on their commitments.  For example, in 
2008, the government budgeted for 3.5 million nets but ended up distributing only about one 
million; only 1/6 of the Ministry of Health funds budgeted for nets in Lusaka, Copperbelt, and 
Central provinces were actually expended. 
Of all the malaria prevention modalities of the program, bed nets suffer from the greatest 
problem in terms of a mismatch between distribution and effectiveness.  The standard guideline 
is that every person living in a household not sprayed with indoor residual spraying should sleep 
under a bed net.   However, utilization remains well below the 85% target.  Some report sleeping 
under a bed net to be uncomfortably hot or claustrophobic, while others report irritation to the 
chemical treatments. There are also frequent reports of people not using nets at all, sometimes 
keeping them packaged as a sign of wealth or using them for other purposes (such as wedding 
veils and fishing nets), but there has been  no systematic study to measure full utilization levels.    
The other primary preventive intervention, indoor residual spraying (IRS), was carried 
out in 36 of Zambia’s 72 districts in 2008
15, targeting primarily urban and peri-urban areas with 
relatively high population densities. Its projected cost was $8.6 million in 2008.  
Treatment is another major component of the national malaria control program. The 
NMCC’s strategic plan targets achieving “Prompt and Effective Case Management” (PECM), 
with a goal of ensuring that at least 80% of malaria patients receive effective treatment within 24 
hours of the onset of symptoms. After noting decreasing efficacy of Sulphadoxine/ 
pyrimenthamine (SP) and chloroquine, Zambia became one of the first countries to introduce 
artemisinin-based combination therapy (specifically artemether plus lumefantrine, with the brand 
name Coartem®). ACTs, free in the public sector, became the first-line treatment for all malaria 
cases during the 2002-2003 malaria transmission season, but it wasn’t until the 2005-2006 
season that the drug reached all districts in the country. Until 2007 the country faced continuing 
challenges to retain national stocks. The national supply stabilized in 2007; since that time there 
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Impact on Malaria in Zambia. Lusaka. 
15 As described in further detail below, IRS spraying was originally only targeted to a handful of urban areas across 
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have not been complete national stock-out periods, though logistical challenges in distribution to 
the provinces, districts and health facilities still remain (Sipilanyambe et al. 2008). 
The total allocation for PECM in 2008 was $11.1 million, approximately 19% of the total 
program budget. Of this money, $2.6 million was designated for malaria diagnostics, primarily 
for the purchase of 2 million rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs). The procurement of 3.8 million 
courses of Coartem® was the largest component of the case management budget, costing $5.3 
million (note that Coartem® is heavily subsidized by its manufacturer, Novartis).   
In the public sector, national treatment guidelines dictate Coartem® as the first line of 
treatment, with quinine (available in tablets and intravenously) reserved for those who fail to 
respond to Coartem®.  Chloroquine and Fansidar® (a combination of Pyrimethamine and 
Sulphadoxine) are no longer to be used for malaria treatment in the public sector, though 
Fansidar® remains the indicated preventive treatment given to pregnant mothers.  In practice, 
however, Fansidar® is often used as a first or second line treatment for patients, especially for 
those who have negative malaria test results.  
When ACTs were introduced in 2003, the high initial cost of the drug prompted an effort 
to improve diagnostics to control the drug prescriptions.  In addition to promoting the increased 
availability of microscopes and trained laboratory technicians, rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) 
were first purchased in 2004 for facilities where microscopes were unavailable.  RDTs are 
simple testing devices allowing malaria diagnosis by a health worker with limited training in just 
fifteen minutes. Global production of RDT kits rose from roughly 3 million in the year 2000 to 
28 million units in 2005 (Frost and Reich, 2008). 
There is an important interaction between availability of RDTs and use of ACTs.  When 
RDTs are not available, there is a strong tendency for health workers to treat all fevers as malaria 
(as it was previously suggested by the WHO), and dispense ACTs accordingly.  When RDTs are 
present, a significant fraction of fevers are determined not to be malaria.  Until 2007, the national 
Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses (IMCI) guidelines dictated that all children under 
5 with fevers were to be presumptively treated for malaria.  National malaria policy guidelines 
revised in 2008 state that it is against national policy to dispense Coartem® to any patient 
weighing more than 5kg (about 3 months old) without a confirmed malaria diagnosis through 
RDT or microscope. However, reaching compliance among clinicians with this remains one of 
the biggest challenges in the national program. A 2007 study found that of 58.4% of patients 
with a negative blood smear and 35.5% of those with a negative RDT result were prescribed an 
antimalarial drug (Hamer et al. 2007).  2008 performance assessments at health facilities reveal 
that some centers are still not using RDTs at all.  Unlike Coartem®, which is on a “push” system 
and comes to the clinic whether they request it or not, RDTs are on a “pull” system and need to 16 
 
be requested.  Data compiled at our malaria workshops shows that the availability of RDTs is 
associated with greatly lower reported cases of malaria and lower use of ACTs. 
The wholesale price of RDT is about $.70, and for ACTs is roughly in the same range 
(Frost and Reich, 2008).  Even though these prices would seem to say that there is no point in 
using RDTs before dispensing ACTs in order to save on costs, the public health benefits of not 
overusing ACTs are enormous, since restricting use will prevent the development of resistance.  
In addition, ruling out malaria allows for better management of negative cases.   
Smaller components of the 2008 budget included: Information, Education, 
Communication/ Behavior Change Communication (IEC/BCC), and Advocacy ($2.2 million), 
Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) ($2.2 million), Operations Research ($986,178), Emergency 
and Epidemic Malaria Preparedness Plan ($982,000), and Entomological Activities ($800,400). 
$877,507 was allocated for program management at the national secretariat. 
A 2008 health facility census recorded 1,554 health facilities, including public, private 
and church-run health centers. Two thirds of these facilities are located in Zambia’s rural areas. 
There are 98 referral hospitals in the country.
16   All districts have an active cadre of lay 
community health workers (CHWs) who supplement permanent health centers. However, the 
level of care CHWs can provide varies widely by district. A current Home Management of 
Malaria initiative (HMM) seeks to train CHWs to administer rapid diagnostic tests and provide 
artemisinin-based combination treatment to patients at their homes; the program is currently 
being scaled up, but continues to face logistical difficulties in providing drugs and supplies to all 
trained volunteers.  
3.2  Non-malaria changes in the Zambian Health  
As mentioned above, the anti-malaria initiative was not the only change in the Zambian 
health environment over the period we examine.  During the period 2003-06 there were a series 
of other health programs occurring, mostly in HIV, tuberculosis, and child health.  In addition, 
the reduction in malaria may have led to decreases in other diseases either through reduced co-
morbidity or through the freeing up of resources within the health care system.     
In 2004, funds from the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) 
began arriving in Zambia.  According the US Embassy, PEPFAR funds in Zambia were $149 
million in 2006, which was spent on prevention, treatment, and care.  One targeted area for 
spending was prevention of mother-to-child transmission, which has the potential to sharply 
reduce child mortality.  
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While the efforts to combat child mortality by reducing tuberculosis and the transmission 
of HIV to children have undoubtedly contributed to the declines in child mortality observed, the 
interactions between these two diseases and malaria are hard to pin down. One of the main 
effects of childhood exposure to malaria is anemia, which makes children more vulnerable to 
other diseases such as tuberculosis and diarrhea. The same could clearly be said the other way 
around: progress made in terms of diarrheal diseases or tuberculosis means healthier children 
with better immune systems.   
4.  Rollout of the program  
4.1  National Data 
Table 4 shows the rollout of the three key pieces of the malaria prevention program: 
ITNs, IRS, and RDTs.
17 The table shows the degree to which the program accelerated in 2006 
and 2007.  Half a million nets were distributed in 2003, but only 176,082 in 2004 (the low 
number has been attributed to foreign donors failing to provide them that year).  The number 
returned to half a million in 2005, then 1.2 million in 2006 and 2.4 million in 2007.
18  As 
discussed above, the decline in bed net distribution in 2008 was not planned as of the beginning 
of that year.  There were to have been 3.5 million nets distributed.  Starting in early 2007, all bed 
nets distributed were Long Lasting Insecticide Treated Nets (LLITNs), which according to the 
WHO and NMCC can last for multiple washes and several years (beyond their expected lifetime 
of three years) without insecticide retreatment.  
In the initial design of the malaria initiative, IRS was to be restricted to only areas of very 
high population density.  The scope of IRS was expanded in discrete jumps through 2008 (see 
Figure 10). The number of households increased dramatically (almost ten-fold) between 2004 
and 2008.  By the latter year, roughly 43% of the population was covered by spraying.  IRS is 
generally conducted at the end of the calendar year, before the onset of the rainy season when 
malaria is high.  IRS must be re-applied each year.   
                                                           
17National Malaria Control and Scaling Up for Impact: The Zambia Experience through 2006 
Richard W. Steketee, Naawa Sipilanyambe, John Chimumbwa, James J. Banda, Abdirahman Mohamed, John 
Miller, Suprotik Basu, Simon K. Miti, and Carlos C. Campbell 
18 NMCC and WHO say any Long Lasting Insecticide Treated Net are effective if distributed in the last 3 years. 
Earlier nets given that were not treated lasted for shorter periods of time, but some retreatment kits were distributed 
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The shift in strategy toward increased reliance on IRS was driven by two factors: first, it 
is seen as more cost effective.  Second, reports of low utilization of bed nets were perceived as a 
major problem.  IRS, once applied, does not require active uptake by the household.  
The last column of Table 4 shows the rapid growth of RDT use, which only happened at 
the very end of our sample period.     
According to the 2007 DHS, 91% of women in urban areas and 84% rural took some 
form of anti-malarial treatment during their last pregnancy and  68%  (61% rural ) received IPT  
during an ante-natal visit.  On average 38% of women used IPT in the 2001 DHS. 
4.2   Regional variation in the rollout 
The fundamental strategy of the anti-malaria initiative was to push distribution and use of 
bed nets in high-malaria, rural areas.  Initially, IRS was targeted only at urban areas; later the 
scope of IRS was expanded to include half the districts in the country.  
4.2.1  ITNs  
The NMCC goal is to ensure that 100% of households in non IRS-targeted areas have at 
least one mosquito net for every two people, with utilization rates of at least 85%. Insecticide-
treated mosquito nets are distributed by the NMCC directly and through a number of partners to 
specific populations. Programs target mothers and infants, vulnerable populations (orphans, 
economically deprived populations, HIV+/AIDS patients), and the general public through 
commercial and subsidized sales, targeted distributions and free mass community distributions.  
Table 5 compares the DHS and NMCC database at the provincial level.   The first two columns 
are based on NMCC data on the number of nets distributed (total and per capita) by province.  
The 2001 DHS finished collecting data in May 2002, while the 2007 DHS began collecting data 
in April of that year.  The number of nets in the table is the total from quarter 3 of 2002 through 
quarter 1 of 2007.   The next three columns use data from the 2001 and 2007 waves of the DHS 
on the fraction of children under five living in a house with at least one bed net.  It is not clear 
whether one would expect a bigger correlation between bed net distribution and the level of bed 
net ownership in 2007 or the change in bed net ownership between 2001 and 2007.  In any case, 
both correlations are high: .73 and .62, respectively.  The last three columns show data on 
whether the child slept under a bed net.  Overall, bed net use more than doubled over this period, 
reaching 43%.  Across provinces, the correlation between the change in bed net ownership and 
the change in bed net use is .72.  The correlation between bed net distribution 2002-07 and the 
level of bed net use in 2007 is .63, while the correlation between bed net distribution and the 
change in bed net use is .57.   19 
 
4.2.2  Indoor Residual Spraying 
Table 6 compares data from the DHS and the NMCC on IRS by district. We use data 
spraying in 2006 (before the rainy season), which was the last spraying before the 2007 DHS.   
The table also shows urbanization rates from the 2000 census. The nine provinces fall into three 
groups.  Four provinces, all with very low rates of urbanization, had no official spraying, and 
fewer than 5% of households report having received spraying.
19  In three provinces, official data 
show 9-16% of households sprayed, and DHS data report roughly commensurate coverage.   
Finally, the two most highly urbanized provinces were targeted for intensive spraying: 
Copperbelt (63% of households) and Lusaka (73%).  In both provinces there is a significant 
shortfall between official estimates and the DHS.  This is particularly severe in Lusaka, where 
only 29% of children in the 2007 DHS reportedly lived in sprayed structures.  Figure 10 shows 
the rollout of spraying at the district level.  The initial 5 districts targeted in 2003 were Kabwe, 
Kitwe, Livingstone, Lusaka and Ndola. These are urban areas, where little net distribution was 
happening at the time, and where spraying was considered a relatively economical option due to 
the relatively high population densities.  The first scale-up came in 2005, with spraying extended 
to Chililabombwe, Chingola, Kalulushi, Luanshya, Mufulira, Chongwe, Kafue, Solwezi, 
Kazungula, and Mazabuka.  In general, spraying was targeted to urban areas where health 
facilities reported high levels of malaria incidence, so that spraying is often concentrated around 
the health facilities reporting to the NMCC via the HMIS. 
5.   Assessing the Link from Rollout to Incidence 
  Ideally, we would like to be able to use data on inputs to better health (that is, preventive 
measures or disease treatments) and health outcomes in order to learn the efficacy of different 
inputs.  Such an endeavor faces obvious problems with identification.  Clearly, the timing and 
spatial distribution of health interventions are not random.  Different modalities are used in 
different locations because health planners make optimizing choices of what will work best in a 
given area.   Similarly, the provision of resources may respond to perceived needs.  For example, 
extra resources may be pushed to areas where health conditions have deteriorated or are forecast 
to deteriorate in the future.  Finally, the efficiency with which health resources are provided may 
be correlated with other factors that directly affect health.  For example, a district with an 
especially competent public health staff may be able to obtain additional resources, but may also 
have had a lower rate of disease incidence even in the absence of these additional resources ( in 
the field we noted that that drug supplies, record keeping and quality, take-up of new treatment 
guidelines and drugs, and involvement of community health volunteers and neighborhood health 
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committees were all highly dependent on the performance of health staff at all levels of the 
system, and that the level of performance varied significantly).   Given these program allocation 
mechanisms, we are only able to identify the causal effect of health interventions to the extent 
that there is some (measureable) randomness to the pattern by which such interventions are 
applied.   
  If there is statistical power to identify the effects of inputs to better health on health 
outcomes, it will generally only be in cases where these inputs deviate from the optimal plan or 
when inputs respond to conditions in some non-continuous fashion.   
Since we do not have a formal model of optimizing choice of treatments, it is not possible 
to formally specify deviation from that optimal plan and use these.  In this paper, we focus on the 
presentation and discussion of observed correlations between the rollout of different malaria 
control modalities and available health outcomes.   
5.1  Bed Nets 
  In addition to the other statistical problems discussed above, assessment of the link from 
ITN distribution to health outcomes is complicated by the facts that ITNs have limited effective 
lifetimes, and that the length of time over which they remain effective has been changing.   
5.1.1  ITNs in the DHS 
  The first measure of malaria we use in the DHS is a binary indicator that equals one if the 
child had a fever over the two weeks preceding the interview.  The data are pooled from the 2001 
and 2007 waves of the DHS; the unit of observation is a child under age five. We include 
dummies for individual years of age and a dummy for being in the 2007 wave.  In addition, all 
specifications control for district fixed effects, sex, mother’s age, mother’s age squared, mother’s 
education, mother’s marital status, mother’s employment status, urban, female household head, 
number of household members and household assets (electricity, radio, television, refrigerator, 
and bicycle). 
  In the first two columns of Table 7, we use indicators for whether a household owns a 
bed net, and for whether the child slept under a bed net the previous night as measures of input to 
malaria control, respectively.  In both cases, we do not think that the estimated coefficient can be 
interpreted structurally, because both ownership and use of the bed net are affected by disease 
conditions and other household characteristics related to health outcomes.  In the third column, 
we use bed net distribution per capita as recorded by the NMCC in the district in the period 
between the two DHS surveys as the independent variable.  The variable is zero for all 2001 
observations. The coefficient is quite significant, and implies that a distribution of one net per 21 
 
person in the district (100% coverage) lowers fever prevalence by about 20 percentage points. In 
column 4 we instrument for household ownership with per-capita distribution in the household’s 
district (the first stage is reported in Table 8).   
In columns 5 and 6 we do a placebo test, using diarrhea in the two weeks preceding the 
interview as a dependent variable; we use OLS in column 5 and apply the same IV strategy used 
in column 4 in column 6.  Diarrhea is an important health outcome, but reductions in prevalence 
should not be related to bed net distribution.  The bed nets have no significant effect.   
One concern with the results in Table 7 is that, as mentioned above, the distribution of 
nets is not random.  Since all the regressions include district fixed effects, the fact that more nets 
are distributed in districts with permanently higher malaria is not a concern.  However if nets are 
distributed in response to temporary changes in malaria prevalence, our results could be biased.  
For example, suppose that nets are targeted to districts experiencing temporarily high malaria 
prevalence.  In this case, our estimate would be biased to show nets being more effective than 
they really are.  To attempt to remove this bias, in Table 9 we control for baseline fever 
prevalence, that is, regress the change in fever between the two DHS surveys on bed net 
coverage as well as the fraction of children with fevers in the two weeks prior to the 2001 DHS 
survey. The coefficient on baseline prevalence is slightly less than one, indicating a moderate 
degree of convergence over time.  The coefficient on bed net distribution per capita falls by 
roughly half but remains significant while the coefficient on household bed nets becomes 
insignificant.  
Finally, in Table 10 we aggregate to the level of districts and do a regression in first 
differences.  The dependent variable is the change in fever prevalence between the two waves of 
the DHS.  The measure of malaria control is the change in bed net ownership, in column 1, and 
ITN distribution in the five years prior to the survey in the other columns.  The results look very 
similar to the individual level regressions.  In particular the effect of ITN rollout falls by about 
half once we control for baseline fever prevalence, but remains significant.   
  In Table 11 we look at child mortality data in the DHS for evidence of the effects of 
ITNs.  As in Tables 7 and 9, we report in columns 1 and 2 results in which the independent 
variable of interest is whether the household owns a bed net and whether children slept under a 
bed net the previous night.  (Note that this latter variable applies the household in which the child 
was born, not the child him/herself.  We cannot use the child specific use variable here since it is 
missing for all the deceased children). We do not interpret these estimates structurally, since 
there are biases that go in both directions: households that care more (or know more) about their 
children’s health are more likely to have their children sleep under a bed net, which would yield 
an overestimate of the true effect. On the other hand, one might also expect some learning from 
the parents’ side:  parents who have lost one child to malaria in the last five years might be more 22 
 
likely to make their remaining children sleep under a net than parents who have not lost a child 
which would yield a selection bias going in the opposite direction. In column 3, we use district 
ITN coverage as the explanatory variable.  The coefficient is borderline significant, but of a large 
magnitude (-.044).  It implies that a full coverage with bed nets (one net per capita) in the years 
prior to the surveys lowers child mortality by 4.4 percentage points from an average baseline 
level of 12.7 in the 2001 survey.  
One concern with the mortality regressions is that mortality covers the whole 5 years 
prior to the survey, while all the household level information we have (ownership and use of bed 
nets, assets etc)  relates to the time of the survey. When restricting the analysis to the three years 
prior to the survey, similar results emerge; with a 1 year restriction, the sample becomes too 
small for identification.  One last interesting finding is the negative estimate on female.  This 
matches raw DHS data: under five mortality in 2007 was estimated at 151 for males and 124 for 
females. 
5.1.2  ITNs in the HMIS 
  Using the HMIS, we can take advantage of much higher frequency data on disease 
impact and more carefully explore time variations in the program rollout relative to the DHS 
data.  Table 12 presents descriptive statistics for our panel of HMIS data.  We match malaria 
inpatients, malaria deaths, and non-malaria deaths, all for children under five, with data on net 
distribution. Since program rollout data is available only at the district level, we aggregate the 
facility-based HMIS data at the same level. 
  Table 13 shows regressions of health outcomes in a district on net distribution in the 
same calendar year as well as the two preceding years.  The top part of the table looks at absolute 
numbers of cases and nets distributed; in the bottom part, cases are normalized by the under-five 
population, and nets are normalized by district population.  Because malaria incidence peaks in 
the first quarter of the year, while nets are distributed throughout the year, our expectation is that 
the greatest impact on disease in a year should be net distribution in the previous year.  Table 13 
shows that this expectation holds true.  The coefficient on net distribution in the previous year is 
always negative and significant as a predictor of malaria cases; nets in the current year are not.  
Interestingly, nets distributed two years earlier are also often insignificant as a predictor of 
malaria cases.   
  The interpretation of the coefficient on once-lagged nets in columns 2 and 3 of the top 
panel is as follows: 100,000 nets distributed lead to a reduction of about 900 under-five malaria 
inpatients and to a reduction of 25 child deaths reported at health facilities in the average district.  
Recall that the HMIS records only about one fourth of deaths.  If we assume that the reduction in 23 
 
HMIS mortality in the regressions is only 25% of the true benefit, 100,000 nets mean 
approximately 100 child lives saved. 
The lower part of the table, where cases and nets are scaled by population, yields 
estimates similar in magnitude. Full coverage of bed nets (one per person) leads lowers malaria 
inpatients by 26 cases per 1000, which is a reduction of 35% relative to the mean. Similarly, full 
bed net coverage lowers malaria deaths per 1000 by a factor of 0.8, which corresponds to a 
reduction of 42% relative to the mean. 
5.2  Indoor Residual Spraying 
  The manner in which IRS was rolled out suggests that it might be a good candidate for 
econometrically identifying the effects of the program on disease outcomes.  In the initial design 
of the malaria initiative, IRS was to be restricted to only areas of very high population density.  
The scope of IRS was expanded in discrete jumps in 2008.  Further, unlike bed nets, IRS must be 
re-applied each year to be effective.  IRS is generally conducted at the end of the calendar year, 
before the onset of the rainy season when malaria is high.   
5.2.1  IRS in the DHS 
Table 14 shows regressions of child fever on spraying, similar to the regressions for bed 
nets reported in Table 7.  When spraying is included alone on the right hand side, the estimated 
coefficient is positive, implying that districts that were sprayed in 2007 had a worse time trend 
for malaria (i.e. slower decline in malaria over time) than those that were not sprayed in that 
year.  This result is driven by a strong negative correlation between the initial fever burden and 
the rollout of the spraying.  By the time of the 2007 DHS, spraying was done in 15 districts, 
which on average had a fever prevalence of 37% in 2001, significantly below the national 
average of 45% in that year.  In 2007, the average fever prevalence in the spraying target areas 
was actually slightly above the non-spraying areas.  This result looks the same when we run the 
regressions at the individual level (households reporting whether or not they have been sprayed 
over the 12 months preceding the interview) as shown in column 2.  
To minimize the potential convergence bias we focus on the 2007 survey only in columns 
3 and 4. In column 3, we use spraying at the household level only; in column 4, we take the 
fraction of households sprayed within the cluster (typically 15 households with children per 
cluster) as explanatory variable. The coefficient becomes negative, but is not significant. Within 
a given district, targeted households and clusters appear to have similar fever prevalence rates to 
non-targeted ones. 24 
 
We are not quite sure what to make out of this result; if the numbers are correct, it could 
either be that spraying misses its target (people get infected outside, or spraying is done before 
the rain and then washed away), or, alternatively, that households that don’t get spraying have 
lower risk or more actively engage in other unobserved preventive measures. 
5.2.2  IRS in the HMIS 
As with the ITN analysis, the use of the HMIS has the main advantage of offering higher 
frequency data when it comes to evaluating the disease impact of the IRS spraying. Given that 
spraying loses its protective effect within about a year, close to all spraying in Zambia arranged 
through the NMCP is done in the last quarter of the each year when the rains start and mosquito 
populations rapidly re-emerge after the dry season. Under ideal conditions, IRS spraying is 
supposed to protect household members throughout the rainy seasons, and to be repeated at the 
end of each year with the new rainfalls.   
In Table 15 A, we try to identify the effects of IRS spraying on the levels of malaria 
inpatients, malaria deaths and deaths due to other causes with a simple IRS spraying target 
dummy. The IRS target dummy variable equals 1 if the district was in the spraying program in a 
given year, and is zero otherwise.  As Figure 10 shows, the rollout of the IRS implemented by 
the NMCP spraying was incremental; any district enrolled in the program since 2003 has been 
receiving spraying in all subsequent years. In columns 1-3, we regress health outcomes on 
spraying without controlling for the contemporaneous net distribution.  The effects of IRS 
spraying on malaria inpatients and malaria deaths are negative, but only marginally significant.  
The estimated coefficient in column 2 implies that being a target district is associated with 22.5 
fewer malaria deaths per year and district. Once we add controls for bed net rollout in columns 4-
6, the estimated effects on the number of under-5 malaria inpatients and deaths become larger 
and more significant. A simple comparison of the estimated coefficients in column 5 implies that 
the effect of becoming a target for spraying is comparable to the distribution of 100,000 nets in 
the preceding year in the average district. 
The results become much weaker, however, when we express patients and mortality 
numbers in population terms, and regress disease burden per capita on per capita measures of bed 
net and spraying rollout in Table 15 B. While the coefficient on bed net distribution remains 
highly significant (and similar in magnitude to the ITN regressions where we do not control for 
spraying), the spraying coverage does not appear to have any effect on the number of malaria 
patients per 1,000 children under 5 in this specification.  The estimated effect on under-5 malaria 
deaths (column 5) is just shy of significance.  The relative magnitude of the coefficients 
estimated in column 5 implies that providing full spraying coverage has about half the effect of 
providing full net coverage. 25 
 
Overall, the estimated effects of the IRS campaign in the HMIS are surprisingly weak 
given the design of the spraying rollout. As Figure 11 illustrates, the IRS campaign is generally 
directly focused around health facilities. Trying to maximize the impact of the campaign, 
programs generally concentrate their efforts to the (catchment) areas directly surrounding 
facilities reporting a high malaria caseload in the given period. Given the stochasticity of local 
malaria incidence, particularly high incidence years in a particular area are likely to be followed 
by more moderate years, so that the simple difference-in-difference model estimated above 
should lead to an overestimation of the true effect. The fact that the effects are weak even in the 
HMIS is thus rather puzzling, but in our view consistent with the rather weak evidence on 
spraying emerging from the DHS analysis. 
6.  Conclusions 
6.1  Future directions for research 
  As mentioned in the Introduction, the current paper is part of a larger project in which the 
authors hope to use the Zambia malaria initiative to better understand the economic effects of 
malaria.  It is worth stepping back for a moment to see why the Zambian experience is 
particularly useful in this regard.  Discussion in the policy community regarding the relative 
priority of improving health in developing countries often points to the economic benefits 
accruing from better health as an important secondary justification complementary to the direct 
humanitarian and health benefits associated with related programs.  The question of how disease 
affects economic growth is well established in the literature.  Much of the discussion of the 
economic effects of malaria among policy makers, for example, cites estimates from the work of 
Gallup and Sachs (2001).  Trying to estimate the effect of health on economic outcomes runs 
into serious identification problems, however.  Omitted factors that affect health may affect 
income directly, or health may respond directly to improvements in income.   The standard 
solution for such an identification problem is to find instrumental variables that directly affect 
health.  These instruments could be some purely exogenous factor or possibly the result of some 
discontinuous response of health inputs to local conditions.  For example, Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2007) use variations in technological progress in controlling different diseases during 
the post World War II period to instrument for health changes at the national level.  Even though 
malaria is viewed as one of the most economically important diseases, most recent studies of its 
economic effects have had to rely on data from episodes of malaria eradication in South Asia and 
Latin America that took place half a century ago (see Lucas (2010), and Bleakley (2007)).  As 
discussed above, the large scaling up of resources devoted to malaria control in Zambia was not 
primarily the result of factors on the ground in the country itself.  Rather, developments on the 
world stage, including the development of new technology and a new alignment of priorities 
within the development community, led to Zambia being chosen as a test case for the possibility 
of rapidly scaled up malaria control.  Thus, at the aggregate level, the timing of the reduction in 26 
 
malaria in Zambia may be viewed as largely exogenous. Of course, Zambia was chosen as the 
first country to receive such intensive support and treatment because it was viewed as having the 
institutional capacity to succeed, and the same factors that were expected to lead to success 
against malaria might have been expected to have independent economic effects, so the 
identification is not perfect.  Nonetheless, the suddenness with which resources were applied 
suggests that reasonable identification may be possible.  Beyond the inferences that can be drawn 
from developments at the national level, our hope is that additional identification can be 
achieved by looking at the manner in which the campaign against malaria was rolled out within 
Zambia.    
  Some of the issues that we hope to investigate in later work include:  
Fertility 
  A substantial literature discusses the link between changes in mortality and changes in 
fertility.  In particular, it is often argued that declining infant and child mortality initially leads to 
a rise in the net rate of reproduction, as actual deaths fall short of expectations, but that in the 
long run the total fertility rate (TFR) and net rate of reproduction decline because of reduced 
uncertainty. In the case of malaria, there is an additional set of considerations, because the 
disease works to lower fecundity directly (Lucas, 2010). Figures from the DHS early release 
show that TFR in Zambia rose from 5.9 to 6.2 over the period 2002-2007 (6.9 to 7.5 in rural 
areas, while urban TFR was flat at 4.0).  The period between DHS surveys corresponds well to 
the period of rollout of the malaria program.   
Productivity 
One way in which malaria affects economic outcomes is by directly lowering the labor 
input of workers, both through absenteeism and reduced physical capacity due to anemia.  There 
are some cases where we hope to observe directly the productivity effects of malaria control.  
We are working on obtaining data from Zambia Sugar, the country’s largest producer, which is 
located in the Mazabuka district.  Zambia Sugar undertook a private eradication effort that 
predated the national effort by several years.   Malaria morbidity has traditionally been quite high 
among cane cutters, who must work in swampy conditions.  We hope to obtain data on changes 
in absenteeism over time (this data was actually collected once already, but was subsequently 
lost).   
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Education 
  Many economists have stressed malaria’s effect on educational attainment as an 
important channel through which the disease affects economic outcomes.  By matching data 
from Zambia’s educational statistics system on grade progress, and dropout rates to data on the 
rollout of the anti-malaria initiative, we hope to investigate how much health improvements have 
lead to an increase in educational attainment.   
6.2  Sustainability and Further Progress 
  One issue raised by progress so far is whether it will be possible to finish the job, and 
reduce malaria incidence to near zero.  The history of anti-malaria campaigns in the years after 
World War II contains several episodes in which malaria was substantially eliminated.   
Eradication is also the NMCC's eventual goal, even if it isn't possible in the short term. There are 
currently some discussions on pilot projects in a few districts to do a massive test and treat 
campaign to reduce parasitemia to near zero. Zambia was chosen as a test country for scale-up 
for multiple reasons: reason—one important reason was that the institutional capacity, good 
governance, and political will existed to make use of the resources. However, it is also the case 
that the climate is favorable to eventual complete eradication because of the cold winters that 
ensure mosquito populations are reduced to near-zero for at least some period annually.   
Until malaria is completely eliminated in the country, however, a serious concern remains 
regardingthe sustainability of gains achieved so far.  As discussed above, Zambia has already 
been through an episode in which significant progress against malaria was followed by a 
resurgence of the disease.  Similarly, in Zambia’s neighbor Zimbabwe, malaria was almost 
completely eradicated, but the political environment led to the end of an effective malaria control 
regime and the disease has subsequently returned to epidemic levels.  In the current Zambian 
environment, disease vectors remain present and a significant number of humans continue to host 
the disease.  This means that unlike places where eradication has been complete, there is always 
the potential for a rapid resurgence, which could be all the more devastating as cohorts with 
lower acquired immunity age through the population.  Maintaining the low current level of 
malaria mortality and morbidity will thus require continued application of inputs at near the 
current level.   The life-span of a bed net averages three years if properly treated, so maintaining 
a ratio of one net for every two persons will require the distribution of approximately 2 million 
nets per year.   Indoor spraying must be repeated annually.  Thus there will be only limited scope 
for a reduction in spending and effort devoted to malaria control.    
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(3)  Post-workshop 
data set
(4) 
Health facilities  1,473  28     1,501 
Quarterly reports   43,455  1,901     45,356 
Outpatient 
observations  2,066,964  76,036  32,510  2,143,000 
Inpatient observations  743,650  23,041  8,638  766,691 
Death observations  365,589  9,132  2,142  374,721 
 
(1) As of 16 Apr 2009; data from previous workshops had not yet been received at national level 
(2) Previously missing data entered       
(3) Previously nonmissing data modified       
(4) As of 31 Dec 2009         
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Table 2: Inpatient and Mortality Data from the HMIS 













































2000  134,516  5,039 96,569 3,882  65,457  2,223  47,818  1,745 
2001  167,814  5,598 117,214 4,352 75,308  2,619  51,158  1,885 
2002  162,760  4,937 114,759 4,530 71,440  2,117  48,857  1,740 
2003  167,919  4,808 124,665 4,727 72,718  1,919  51,079  1,895 
2004  136,623  4,056 99,938 4,352  56,524  1,626  40,159  1,572 
2005  139,808  3,489 96,014 3,979  56,557  1,357  38,952  1,629 
2006  141,312  3,235 96,977 3,096  56,251  1,295  40,056  1,383 
2007  119,618  2,684 83,599 2,356  50,092  1,160  34,703  1,070 
2008  69,637  1,680 56,693 1,566  32,004  861  26,972  807 
                





















































2000  148,116  11,684 225,018 15,713  70,757  5,644  105,645  7,507 
2001  183,368  12,103 248,121 16,699  75,893  5,380  109,316  7,426 
2002  169,333  12,090 287,986 18,913  67,356  4,872  116,814  7,538 
2003  172,021  11,224 286,737 19,758  70,220  4,618  117,027  8,401 
2004  137,414  9,810  280,107  20,967 57,332  3,906 111,896 8,033 
2005  156,309  9,641  298,237  20,709 68,430  3,842 120,392 8,064 
2006  152,304  9,315  291,504  20,052 65,545  3,568 117,190 7,708 
2007  157,118  9,816  297,832  17,652 69,290  4,477 119,387 6,939 
2008  124,813  6,423  231,925  12,887 68,627  3,269 112,440 6,193 
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Table 3: Seasonality and Changes over Time  
  Under 5 Deaths per 1000 – All Causes  Under 5 Deaths per 1000 – Malaria  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Second quarter  -0.326***  -0.324***  -0.136***  -0.111*** 
 (0.0486)  (0.0652)  (0.0202)  (0.0270) 
Third quarter  -0.726***  -0.584***  -0.360***  -0.258*** 
 (0.0488)  (0.0656)  (0.0203)  (0.0271) 
Fourth quarter  -0.431***  -0.318***  -0.235***  -0.152*** 
 (0.0488)  (0.0657)  (0.0203)  (0.0272) 
Pre 2004    1.186***    0.522*** 
   (0.0869)    (0.0359) 
Second Q. * pre    -0.00536    -0.0563 
   (0.0976)    (0.0404) 
Third Q. * pre    -0.317***    -0.227*** 
   (0.0978)    (0.0405) 
Fourth Q. * pre    -0.251**    -0.185*** 
   (0.0978)    (0.0405) 
Year 2001  0.0697  0.0697  0.0438  0.0438 
 (0.0728)  (0.0726)  (0.0302)  (0.0300) 
Year 2002  -0.148**  -0.149**  -0.0830***  -0.0832*** 
 (0.0728)  (0.0726)  (0.0303)  (0.0300) 
Year 2003  -0.346***  -0.346***  -0.121***  -0.121*** 
 (0.0728)  (0.0726)  (0.0302)  (0.0300) 
Year 2004  -0.733***  0.608***  -0.255***  0.249*** 
 (0.0728)  (0.0744)  (0.0302)  (0.0308) 
Year 2005  -0.808***  0.534***  -0.294***  0.209*** 
 (0.0728)  (0.0744)  (0.0302)  (0.0308) 
Year 2006  -0.931***  0.411***  -0.330***  0.174*** 
 (0.0728)  (0.0745)  (0.0303)  (0.0308) 
Year 2007  -1.008***  0.334***  -0.384***  0.120*** 
 (0.0730)  (0.0746)  (0.0303)  (0.0308) 
Year 2008  -1.344***    -0.505***   
 (0.0746)    (0.0310)   
Constant 2.584***  1.178***  0.872***  0.316*** 
 (0.0595)  (0.0668)  (0.0247)  (0.0276) 
        
Observations 2562 2562  2562  2562 
R-squared 0.550  0.554  0.417  0.426 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. All estimates include district fixed effects. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Data source: HMIS 34 
 
Table 4: Rollout Data at the National Level 
 
 
Number of bed nets 
distributed 
Population covered by 
spraying 
RDTs Distributed 
2002 112,020    -    0 
2003 557,071    324,137   0 
2004 176,082    679,582   0 
2005 516,999    1,163,802   172,257 
2006 1,163,113    2,836,778   25,700 
2007 2,446,102    3,286,514   243,600 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Bed Nets, Child Fever and Child Diarrhea, DHS 
Dependent variable  Child had fever over last two weeks  Diarrhea 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Household owns net  -.0213*       -0.921***    -0.124 
  (0.0111)     (0.267)  (0.255) 
Child slept under net    -0.0106         
    (0.0110)      
Bed net distribution pc    -0.209***    -0.0286   
     (0.0487)  (0.0703)  
Child age 1  0.0639***  0.0641***  0.0648***  0.0672***  0.181***  0.181*** 
  (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0154) (0.0252) (0.0315) 
Child age 2  0.0142  0.0150  0.0150  0.00604  -0.0307  -0.0319 
  (0.0132) (0.0134) (0.0132) (0.0150) (0.0252) (0.0297) 
Child age 3  -0.0728***  -0.0730***  -0.0713***  -0.0798***  -0.195***  -0.196*** 
  (0.0125) (0.0127) (0.0125) (0.0154) (0.0247) (0.0262) 
Child  age  4  -0.121*** -0.120*** -0.121*** -0.122*** -0.275*** -0.275*** 
  (0.0127) (0.0129) (0.0127) (0.0159) (0.0216) (0.0236) 
2
nd wave dummy  -0.243***  -0.250***  -0.197***  0.101  -0.0736***  -0.0335 
  (0.0115) (0.0109)  (0.0169) (0.107) (0.0257)  (0.0967) 
        
Constant  0.546*** 0.548*** 0.548*** 0.406*** 0.735*** 0.773*** 
  (0.0752)  (0.0759)  (0.0749)  (0.117) (0.138) (0.196) 
        
Observations  11193 11027 11193 11193 11187 11187 
R-squared  0.129  0.128 0.131 -0.513 0.065 0.063 
Notes: All specifications control for district fixed effects, sex, mother’s age, mother’s age 
squared, mother’s education, mother’s marital status, mother’s employment status, urban, female 
household head, number of household members and household assets (electricity, radio, TV, 
refrigerator and bicycle).    Robust standard errors in parentheses .   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Table 8: First Stage Results for Column 4 (and 6) in Table 7 
 




ITN per capita  0.230*** 
 (0.0662) 
Child age 1  0.00210 
 (0.0104) 
Child age 2  -0.0106 
 (0.00925) 
Child age 3  -0.0107 
 (0.0104) 
Child age 4  -0.00518 
 (0.00934) 
2











Notes: Includes  control for district fixed effects, sex, mother’s age, mother’s age squared, 
mother’s education, mother’s marital status, mother’s employment status, urban, female 
household head, number of household members and household assets (electricity, radio, tv, 
fridge and bike).  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9:  Control for baseline level in micro-level regression, DHS 
Dependent 
variable 
Child had fever over last two weeks  Diarrhea 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Household owns 
net 
-0.0141     -0.695    -0.0429 
 (0.0105)      (0.496)    (0.597) 
Child slept under 
net 
 -0.00428         
   (0.00895)         
Bed net distribution    -0.104***    -0.00656   
     (0.0364)    (0.0922)   
Child age 1  0.0640***  0.0644***  0.0645***  0.0665***  0.181***  0.181*** 
 (0.0121)  (0.0121)  (0.0121)  (0.0148)  (0.0328)  (0.0326) 
Child age 2  0.0119  0.0129  0.0124  0.00701  -0.0312  -0.0315 
 (0.0130)  (0.0130)  (0.0130)  (0.0131)  (0.0323)  (0.0312) 
Child age 3  -0.0706***  -0.0704***  -0.0700***  -0.0770***  -0.194***  -0.195*** 
 (0.0109)  (0.0109)  (0.0110)  (0.0121)  (0.0281)  (0.0265) 
Child age 4  -0.122***  -0.120***  -0.122***  -0.122***  -0.276***  -0.276*** 
 (0.0115)  (0.0118)  (0.0116)  (0.0126)  (0.0263)  (0.0260) 
Baseline fever 
preval. 0.867***  0.888***  0.806***  0.393  0.168  0.143 
 (0.0944)  (0.0933)  (0.0973)  (0.400)  (0.227)  (0.495) 
Constant            
            
Observations 11193  11027  11193  11193  11187  11187 
R-squared 0.136  0.135  0.136  -0.229  0.065  0.065 
Notes: All specifications control for district fixed effects, sex, mother’s age, mother’s age 
squared, mother’s education, mother’s marital status, mother’s employment status, urban, female 
household head, number of household members and household assets (electricity, radio, tv, 
fridge and bike). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10:   District-level Differences, DHS    
  Dependent variable: Change in fever prevalence 
        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         
Change in ownership  -0.136           
  (0.0935)       







    (0.0739) (0.0357) (0.0367) (0.0399) (0.0402) 











     (0.0983)  (0.0981)  (0.124)  (0.125) 
Change in mother 
education 
    -0.0452  -0.0427  -0.0346 
      (0.0430)  (0.0416)  (0.0407) 
Change in mother 
working 
     -0.0341  -0.0392 
       (0.0340)  (0.0328) 
Change  in  average  age        -0.0545 













  (0.0446) (0.0253) (0.0428) (0.0424) (0.0510) (0.0515) 
        
Observations  70 70 70 70 70 70 
R-squared  0.044 0.107 0.617 0.622 0.627 0.637 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11: Bed nets and Child Mortality 
Dependent variable  Death of child  
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
HH owns bed net  -0.00968         
 (0.00690)         
Kids in HH slept with  
bed net  
 -
0.0486*** 
   
   (0.00608)      
ITN district coverage      -0.0443*  -0.0361*  0.0116 
     (0.0255)  (0.0216)  (0.00808) 











  (0.00538) 
 
(0.00535) (0.00539) (0.00489)  (0.00214) 
2










  (0.00629) (0.00587) (0.00926) (0.00805)  (0.00361) 
        




       O l d e r   2  
Constant  0.270*** 0.254*** 0.271*** 0.232***  0.0171 
  (0.0478) (0.0474) (0.0479) (0.0426)  (0.0176) 
        
Observations  13201 13201 13201 12835  11941 
R-squared  0.032 0.036 0.032 0.034  0.022 
Notes: All specifications control for age and district fixed effects, mother’s age, mother’s age 
squared, mother’s education, mother’s marital status, mother’s employment status, urban, female 
household head, number of household members and household assets (electricity, radio, tv, 
fridge and bike). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 12:  Descriptive statistics of district level panel HMIS 
 Obs  Mean  Std.Dev  Min  Max 
Malaria inpatients under 5  645  1922  1531  0  8169 
Malaria deaths under 5  645  55  55  0  325 
Other deaths under 5  645  142  181  0  1770 
Nets (‘000)  648  9  20  0  182 
District population (‘000)  648  157  153  19  1341 
Malaria inpatients per 1000 children under 5  645  72.01  46.54  0  343.87 
Malaria deaths per 1000 children under 5  645  1.91  1.37  0  8.81 
Other deaths per 1000 children under 5  645  4.67  3.59  0  21.57 
Nets  per capita  648  0.06  0.12  0  0.71 
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  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         
Nets current year        -0.680  -0.0913  -0.101 
       (1.875)  (0.0767)  (0.169) 
Nets previous 
year 
-8.888*** -0.255***  -0.143  -9.422*** -0.342***  -0.210 
  (2.307) (0.0651)  (0.156) (2.643) (0.0813) (0.165) 
Nets two years 
ago 
     -4.856  -0.315***  -0.488* 
       (3.881)  (0.0972)  (0.260) 
         
Constant  2263*** 68.53***  166.9*** 2264*** 68.70***  167.0*** 
  (53.05) (2.744)  (4.921) (60.00) (3.014) (5.257) 
         
Observations  573 573  573 501 501 501 
R-squared  0.872 0.741  0.904 0.881 0.774 0.904 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level. All specifications include 
year and district fixed effects.  Nets are in thousands.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  44 
 































         
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         
Nets per capita        6.088  -0.121  -1.543 
       (9.872)  (0.309)  (1.102) 
L1 nets per 
capita 
-26.25*** -0.778***  -0.709  -30.14**  -0.852**  -1.797* 
  (9.279) (0.271)  (0.769) (12.74) (0.382) (1.077) 
L2 nets per 
capita 
     -33.50  -0.0370  -3.839** 
       (36.40)  (0.817)  (1.557) 
         
Constant  59.75*** 1.316***  3.673*** 89.62*** 2.295*** 5.334*** 
  (2.751) (0.0930)  (0.191) (2.836) (0.0940) (0.185) 
         
Observations  573 573  573 501 501 501 
R-squared  0.811 0.634  0.744 0.824 0.637 0.771 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level. All specifications include 
year and district fixed effects. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 14: IRS Results, DHS 
Dependent variable  Child had fever over last two weeks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Percentage of district population 
sprayed 
0.102***     
  (0.0192)     
Household sprayed (self-report)    0.0482**  -0.0162   
   (0.0195)  (0.0199)  
Fraction of households sprayed in 
cluster 
    -0.00778 
      (0.0394) 
 








  (0.00277) (0.00277) (0.00330) (0.00331) 
 
2
nd wave dummy  -0.283***  -0.257***     
 (0.0122)  (0.0108)     
      
Constant  0.614*** 0.622*** 0.361*** 0.357*** 
  (0.0733) (0.0733) (0.0919) (0.0921) 
      
Observations 11524  11523  5671  5672 
R-squared  0.123 0.121 0.047 0.046 
All specifications control for district fixed effects, sex, mother’s age, mother’s age squared, 
mother’s education, mother’s marital status, mother’s employment status, urban, female 
household head, number of household members and household assets (electricity, radio, tv, 
fridge and bike). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
            
Spraying target 
dummy 
-241.5 -22.57* 0.539  -308.9* -24.72** -0.278 
 (189.1)  (12.15)  (17.62)  (176.4)  (12.12)  (17.28) 
 
Lag 1 Bed nets in 
‘000 
     -9.351***  -0.298***  -0.113 
       (2.324)  (0.0702)  (0.147) 
            
Constant 1713***  42.18***  129.7***  2262***  68.51***  166.9*** 
 (70.43)  (2.690)  (11.44)  (51.98)  (2.513)  (4.905) 
            
Observations 573  573  573  573  573  573 
R-squared 0.866  0.760  0.905  0.873  0.766  0.905 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level. All specifications include 
year and district fixed effects. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         
Fraction  sprayed    6.199 -0.416  0.792 2.526 -0.558 0.722 
  (9.660) (0.370)  (0.559) (9.760) (0.372) (0.543) 
 
Nets per capita        -25.38***  -0.984***  -0.484 
       (9.548)  (0.257)  (0.704) 
           
Constant  55.53*** 1.273***  3.421*** 59.29*** 1.419*** 3.492*** 
  (3.029) (0.0892)  (0.208) (3.555) (0.0968) (0.190) 
         
Observations  573 573  573 573 573 573 
R-squared  0.809 0.656  0.787 0.811 0.661 0.787 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level. All specifications include 
year and district fixed effects. Net distribution and spraying numbers reflect program activities in 
the preceding year. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Malaria deaths under age 5
Malaria death age 5 and older49 
 





























































































































Under-5 deaths per 1000 
Under-5 deaths  per 1000 high quality sample50 
 





































































DHS under-5 mortality HMIS under-5 mortality51 
 
Figure 4: Mortality Changes: HMIS vs. DHS 
 
Note: Horzontal axis is change in the under five mortality rate divided by the 2001 level.  































































Change in under-5 mortality DHS 2001-200752 
 














2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Outpatients under 5 Outpatients 5 and over
Inpatients under 5 Inpatients 5 and over
Deaths under 5 Deaths 5 and over53 
 















































Under-5, always reporting only
Age 5 and older, all facilities
Age 5 and older, always reporting only54 
 
Figure 7:  Seasonality of Mortality in the HMIS 
 













































Malaria under-5 deaths55 
 
Figure 8:  Change in Seasonality of Malaria Mortality 
 












































Figure 9:  Change in the Seasonality of All-Cause Mortality 
 
Source: See Table 3.   
 
 















































Figure 10: IRS Distribution by r
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Figure 11: Health Facilities and S
 
Source: NMCC. Green crosses rep




d Spraying in the Chingola District 2008  
epresent health facilities, black dots sprayed structu
58 
 
ctures. Grey 